The book is an ambitious and bold attempt of outlining some common thread in the constant flux of neuroscience research. Readers with their background in computer science and not so familiar with the multifaceted complexity of computational neuroscience can find an inspirational and wide-ranging tour d'horizon of neuro-anatomy, neuro-physiology, neuroembryology, neuro-phylogeny, etc. Readers with a more pronounced inclination in the neurosciences are offered a framework for modeling brain organization and activities. A recurrent concept is that, in spite of their undeniable advances, cellular and molecular neurosciences are ill-suited to capture the overall picture but their reductionistic shortsightedness might find a guiding hand in what the authors call "systems neuroscience". From this schema theory is proposed as a general framework for designing models and interpreting experimental results. However, this is the less convincing part of the book, even if one agrees with the premise, the need of a non-reductionist brain theory on the side of cellular and molecular neuroscience.
models follow schemas and not the opposite. This explains the criticism of neural network modeling and connectionism (p. 33 and other parts of the book).
We might also find a parallel between the "software" nature of schemas and David Marr's approach toward perceptual-motor modeling, although the authors explicitly criticize the well known Marr's 2½-D primal sketch of early visual processing. Marr posits that in attempting to understand perception and action one has to follow a logical order by asking (1) what is the problem from the computational point of view, (2) why it needs to be solved, and only finally (3) how would such a solution would be "implemented" in the brain. One of the fundamental contributions of the neural network modeling revolution of the 80's is just to negate the conceptual necessity or even usefulness of the software/hardware dualism in computational neuroscience. Understanding the ways in which brain structures learn and process information is the necessary prerequisite for constraining functional models like Marr's primal sketch or Arbib's schemas in an empirically plausible way and not the opposite: neuralizing a functional model on the basis of empirical knowledge. In the connectionist way of thinking it still makes sense to conceive of schemas as emergent patterns, arising from the complex non-linear dynamics of interacting neural networks coupled with the equally complex dynamics of the outside world. But this is a quite different kind of schema.
Probably the same bias toward an idealistic interpretation of neural processes, implicit in the schema theory, can justify the neglect of the authors for the role of the mechanical properties of muscles (and of biomechanics in general) in the neural organization of action and the action-perception cycle. Curiously this is in contrast with the opinion expressed by the authors, which I deeply share, that "the key for analyzing the brain …. is to understand how local interactions can integrate themselves to yield some overall results without explicit executive control" (p. 42). After the work of Bernstein, Feldman, Bizzi and many others it has become clear that the organization of motor patterns cannot be understood without taking into account the mechanical properties of muscles. One can agree or disagree with specific aspects of the many versions of mass-spring models, lambda or alpha models and the like but the basic idea is now well established. Internally generated patterns alone are insufficient to determine purposive actions in a reliable way and mechanical compliance carries out a double computational function: it is at the same time a source of information on external dynamics and a tunable coupling device for allowing such processes to become "partners" not obstacles in the formation of complex sensorimotor patterns. In general, one can observe that the actionperception cycle implies a bidirectional flow of energy between biological organisms and their environments as well as a circular flow of information. Both flows are essential for the selforganization of purposive actions but their interplay cannot be understood in terms of functional schemas alone.
As regards self-organization, the authors are well aware of its importance. For example, they speak of cooperative computation as a pattern of strengthening alliance between mutually consistent scheme instances. But how this might be carried out in the actual neural machinery is not even hinted. The problem is in the level of analysis. Choosing the software modular level (implicit for example in the notion of "instantiating" multiple schema copies for "schema assembly") automatically sets the insurmountable obstacle of the "credit assignment problem" that has motivated much of connectionist research in the first place. As a matter of fact, understanding the ways in which self-organizing processes shape the formation of brain structures and brain functions is clearly a work in progress; however, the key is in emphasizing the constraining role of the non-linear dynamics of the organism-environment interaction, on one side, and the interactions among neural assemblies as in the formation of cortical maps, on another, rather than an abstract self-organization of schemas. Braitenberg and coworkers (1997) have clearly identified the distinction but at the same time the deep complementarity between the brain representations of morphologicalgeometric objects, on the one hand, and dynamic-physical objects, on the other, suggesting that the cerebral cortex and the cerebellar circuitry, respectively, might be the candidate brain structures for the two types of computational functions. As a further clarification of the same theme, we wish to quote the recent work by Doya (1999) , who has pointed out that the learning paradigm, rather than specific perceptual or motor functions, characterizes in a unique way the computational nature of these two brain macro-areas, as well as their natural partners (the basal ganglia),: (i) an unsupervised self-organizing paradigm in the cerebral cortex, for building cortical maps (ii) a (self)-supervised paradigm in the cerebellar circuitry, for learning internal dynamical models, and (iii) a reinforcement learning paradigm, in the basal ganglia, for learning sequential aspects of actions in complex tasks.
As regards cortical maps the authors appear to share the opinion of some neurophysiologists (recently summarized in a review paper by Rizzolatti et al.1998 ) that beyond primary cortical areas somatotopic structure is hardly significant, because we observe a fragmentation of cortical representations of body parts and highly specialized neural clusters, such as "mirror neurons". This is deemed to rule out the possibility of unitary computational functions of associative cortical areas, as the classic concept of "body schema". In fact, this view is consistent with the articulated and somehow fragmented nature of the schema assembly concept but its Achille's heel is the formation of coherent assemblies of cortical clusters, i.e. again the credit assignment problem. The authors do not take into account a computational alternative for explaining the apparent fragmentation while maintaining a common representation which is outlined in Morasso & Sanguineti (1997) : if cortical maps are trained to represent higher-dimensional manifolds, as is possibly the case in associative parietal areas, then the apparent fragmentation is a side-effect of a hardware constraint (hosting an N-dimensional grid on a 2-dimensional substrate) but is compensated by using long-distance cortico-cortical connections (that are known to be present in a massive and organized manner).
Summing up, a feasible alternative to a "functional decomposition" of brain activity in terms of schemas is a "computational decomposition" in terms of maps, dynamic models and sequences that is grounded in the organization of the neural hardware and exhibits functional regularities as "emergent properties". The difference between the two alternatives can be appreciated also in relation with the notion of intelligence, whose evolution is discussed in pages 260-1 of the book in relation with the "Great Move" idea of A. Newell (1990) . His observation is that as biological organisms became more and more complex as a result of natural selection, then learning an exponentially increasing set of specialized mechanisms became inefficient and might have prompted the "Great Move" of evolution: "establishing a neutral, stable medium that is capable of registering variety and then composing whatever transformation are needed". The core of the argument is the neutral computational medium and we suggest that from what we know about neuroscience it should be capable to build internal representations of the outside world in terms of maps, dynamic processes and sequences, independent of any functional schema.
